



REMARKS

ON THE

LETTER

ADDRESS'D TO

TWO GREAT MEN.



[PRICE ONE SHILLING.]

R. E. M. K. S.

ON

J. E. T. H. R.

TWO GREAT MEN

PRICE ONE DOLLAR

REMARKS

ON THE

LETTER

ADDRESS'D TO

TWO GREAT MEN.

In a LETTER to the

AUTHOR of that PIECE.

*Vis consilii expers mole ruit sua:
Vim temperatam di quoque provebunt
In majus: idem odere vires
Omne nefas animo mordentes.*

HOR.

The THIRD EDITION, Corrected.

L O N D O N:

Printed for R. and J. DODSLEY, in Pall-Mall.

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REMARKS, &c.

S I R,

I Shall not enquire who is the Author of the Piece on which I am going to remark. Your Opinions, and your Arguments are all that I shall consider. Whether you are, or ever have been † pensioned and employed, whether you are a private Man, or a Person distinguished in Rank and Fortune, you are to me and to the Publick on this occasion, only the Author of the Letter to Two Great Men; and you will give me leave to address you in that and in no other Light. It is indeed a Light, in which you cannot be viewed to your disadvantage; your Letter is animated with the Spirit of true Patriotism; it discovers political and historical Knowledge; and it is written throughout with Fire and Energy.

But, Sir, that animation of Language and Sentiment, which is allowed to the Orator in Political Conflicts *in Pulvere et in Sole*, has no place in a sober Discussion. I write not to the Ear or to the Passions;

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I aim

† Vid. p. 2. of the Letter.

I aim at no Seduction of Judgment ; and I ask for no approbation but what a calm Reflection and unprejudiced Reason may afford me. My End is, rather to examine the justness of your Plan, than to enforce any Plan of my own ; and I shall not affect the Flow, nor the Pomp, nor the high colouring of Parliamentary Declamation. If I can deliver a plain Argument in plain Language, it is all I aim at : for what I am doing I shall make no Apology. That Freedom with which you warn the Ministry against falling into Mistakes in the ensuing Treaty, will justify me to you, and to the World, if I should attempt to point out some of those Mistakes, into which I imagine you are yourself fallen.

You cannot be ignorant in what manner Success operates upon the Minds of Men ; with what a blind and haughty Confidence it inspires them ; and in the insolent Elation of Victory, how little they attend to Reason, or Justice, and often to their own most important Interests. People of all Nations imagine, that when they are worsted, Success gives their Enemy very little Right to prescribe severe Terms ; and conceive when they are

are themselves successful, that there are no Bounds to their own Pretensions. If such a Disposition should happen at this time to prevail amongst us, it may be attended with very pernicious Consequences. It may raise such extravagant Expectations, or excite such wrong-placed Desires, as will render a Negotiation for Peace a Work of infinite Difficulty. A virtuous and able Ministry may in some sort find their Virtue and Ability brought to act against themselves; they may find that their Victories and Successes have excited so much Arrogance in those who had no Share in acquiring them, as to destroy all their Effects; they may find their Virtue and Moderation overruled by the Madness of the People, and be thus disabled from availing themselves of a successful War, for the Attainment of an advantageous Peace.

I am afraid, Sir, that your Letter tends to increase and to inflame this Disposition: you are not to be blamed for delivering your Sentiments openly; the Liberty of an Englishman, and your own Abilities, give you a right to do so. What I blame is your excessive Attachment to certain Objects; so excessive that if

they should not be insisted upon by the Ministry, with a Warmth equal to your own, you hesitate not to declare to the People, * *that we shall have a treacherous and delusive Peace.* This, Sir, is surely a most unjustifiable Method of proceeding; it is to sow the Seeds of a general Discontent in favour of your particular Opinions; Opinions, which if they are not ill founded, are at least very problematical: I cannot help observing, that your Resentment against the Perfidy of the Enemy, has made you seem much more intent upon affronting *France*, than providing deliberately for the Interests of *Britain*.

You set forth with great Strength of Fact and Reason, the treachery of *France*, and her frequent Violations of the most solemn Treaties. You insist particularly on the Case of *Dunkirk*: and I admit that you could not have chosen a more proper Instance. But I am sorry to see that you are even here, guided more by old Prejudices than by the true Nature of Things; and that you have proposed such a *Manner* of acting, that whilst we are in reality

* Vid. p. 29. of the Letter.

only demanding our honest and unquestionable Rights, we shall have all the Appearance of acting with the most wanton Insolence, with the most hateful Oppression.

You advise the Two Great Men, that, "*|| before they enter upon any new Treaty, or listen to any plausible Proposal whatever, they ought to insist that Justice may be done with regard to former Treaties, shew France the solemn Engagements she entered into at Utrecht to demolish Dunkirk. "Demand," say you, "immediate Justice on that Article, as a preliminary Proof of her Sincerity in the ensuing Negotiation. Tell them with the Firmness of wise Conquerors, that the Demolition of Dunkirk is what you are entitled to by Treaties made long ago and violated, and that it shall not be so much as mentioned in the ensuing Negotiation, but complied with before that Negotiation shall commence.*"

This is a Sort of Language hitherto, I believe, unheard in *Europe*; but why you confine these extraordinary Demands to *Dunkirk* I cannot imagine. Why do you

¶ Vid. p. 24, 25.

not

not insist that *France* should in the same previous manner renounce all Right to the disputed Parts of *America*? You will I hope allow, that the *French* Encroachments there, are as much against the Faith of Treaties, as the Restoration of *Dunkirk*; and that we have full as good a right to expect every Reparation of Interest and Honour with regard to the one, as to the other. But if all Points wherein the Violation of Treaties is charged, ought not, (according to your Doctrine,) to be so much as mentioned in the ensuing Negotiation, but ought to be settled before that Negotiation shall commence; the Business of the Congress will be so very short, and so very easy, as to require no wonderful Share of that Knowledge, that Adroitness, and all that Combination of Talents, and Virtues, which you demand in a Plenipotentiary; but which you are almost in Despair of finding among our Nobility. An *English* Plenipotentiary, to speak and to act to the Letter of the Instructions, which you give him, need only assume a decisive and dictatorial Tone; to rail abundantly at those employed by the Enemy to treat with him; to remind *them of their amazing Perfidy*; * to tell them *that he owes them*

* P. 24.

them a Disgrace †; to tell them that he can have no Dealings with such a People; * and thus to go through the little that is left to be done with as great Airs of Arrogance and Superiority as he can possibly assume. These are Accomplishments indeed not difficult to be found, and which we need not despair to meet with at *Arthur's*, or on the *Turf*. ‡

I do not, Sir, mean to insinuate, that the Demolition of *Dunkirk* is not an Object worthy of our regard. It is indeed probably not of quite so much Importance, as you think it, and as formerly it was thought, whilst in the Continental Wars of King *William*, and Queen *Anne*, we neglected our Naval Strength, and the due Protection of our Trade. However, as it is still an Object, there is no doubt but in the ensuing Negotiation our Ministry will attend with proper Care to have it demolished, according to the Tenor of former Treaties. This, Sir, we may suppose with some Assurance, will be done. But that this be done before we condescend to treat, that it is to be a Preliminary to the Preliminaries of Peace, is an Idea altogether extravagant, and as little

† P. 25.

* P. id..

‡ P. 6.

justified

justified by Precedent as by Reason. That those very Matters for which War was declared should not be so much as mentioned in the Negotiation for Peace, is a Principle absolutely your own, and to which all the Writers on Politicks have to this Day been entirely Strangers. You seem indeed aware of this, and therefore assert that such Demands as you propose † “ cannot be looked upon as the Infolence of a Conqueror, but as the wise Fore-sight of a People, whom dear-bought Experience hath taught the proper Way of doing itself Justice. For you observe some few Lines before, that we ought “ § to take every Method in “ our Power to *secure* the Observance of “ those Concessions they may make; and “ to insist upon their giving us such *Proofs* “ of their *Sincerity* before any Negotiation “ is entered upon, as may give us some “ Assurance, that they *mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements.*” The way then in which you propose we should do ourselves Justice, is to insist that *Dunkirk* be demolished before we listen to any Proposal of Peace, because you imagine that a Compliance with this Demand by *France* will be a Proof of their

† Vid. p. 9. of the Letter. § Ibid.

Sincerity,

Sincerity, and a Security for their adhering to the Treaty.

I should, Sir, most willingly concur with you, in recommending any Method which might secure their Adherence to such Concessions as they shall make; which might draw from them any *real Proof of their Sincerity*, or which would give us *some Assurance that they mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements*: but I have considered your Demand in every Light which I was capable of putting it; and after all I am utterly unable to discover, if *France* should submit to the humiliating Step you propose, what additional Security this will, or can give us, that she will adhere to her Engagements whenever she shall find it her Interest to break them. This Step may indeed be a mortifying Confession of her present Weakness, but can be no Security for her future Faith.

So far from having any such Operation, there is all Reason to suppose that it would produce the contrary Effect. A Nation which through the Necessity of its Affairs, submits to Terms imposed for no other purpose than to
insult

insult her, seeks the first Opportunity to wipe off the Stain. She will not look upon such Engagements as a Treaty, but as an Oppression; and she will find a sort of Excuse for the Infidelity of her Conduct, in the Insolence of ours. Nations, like Men, resent an Insult more than an Injury.

Unreasonable as this Demand may be, you however seem fond of it; for you again ask, "Can you have any Dealings with a Power, who, if he refuses this, at the very Time that he is treating, affords you a manifest Proof that his Word is not to be relied upon, and that you cannot trust to the Execution of any Promises ever so solemnly made?" Why not? You may, Sir, undoubtedly have Dealings with such a Power, notwithstanding such a Refusal; because they only do what is extremely natural, and extremely reasonable, in refusing to destroy a Place which is of use to them in War, before their Enemy has condescended to treat for Peace. You

Vid. p. 25. of the Letter.

do

do not sure imagine, that any Nation is so ignorant and sottish as not to know, that the Weakening its Hands before a Negotiation for Peace, is not the way to secure it good Terms in that Negotiation; and that they may well refuse to comply with this ignominious and unsafe Condition, without manifesting any Intention of swerving from their future Engagements. If it could be supposed for a Moment that our Administration would adopt your System, might not *France* in her turn ask, and very reasonably too, What Security we propose to give, if she should submit to this extraordinary previous Preliminary, that we shall even then consent on our Side to an equitable Peace? Or that this first unreasonable Demand may not be followed by others still more unreasonable, whilst we have any thing to ask; or she any thing to give? To answer *Væ victis* would sound strangely; to answer otherwise with Consistency is impossible; and it must be allowed, that so extraordinary a Demand previous to a Treaty, would be a very bad Omen of our Moderation in the Treaty itself. A Compliance with it would indeed
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mortify the Enemy, but it would add nothing to our real Strength; whilst it would alarm every Nation near us, and assist *France* in exciting that Jealousy of the *British* Naval Power, which she has for a long Time been labouring with great Industry, and some Success, to infuse into all the Nations of *Europe*, and particularly into the Maritime States. You have very well observed upon the Terror which was excited by the Power of *Lewis XIV.* and upon the general Confederacy against him, which was the Consequence of this Power: but you have forgot to add, that the insolent use he made of his Greatness, alarmed as much, and provoked much more, than that enormous Power itself: it was indeed the true Cause of his Fall. Other Nations also may be thought too powerful; and they will be thought so, whenever they exercise their Power with Haughtiness. Without having recourse to † a *Montesquieu*, perhaps, Sir, it may be found that the *Roman*, the *Spanish*, and

† P. 38. of the Letter. Perhaps it might on Inquiry be worthy of another *Montesquieu* to assign the Causes of the Rise and Fall of the *French* Monarchy, &c.

the *French* Grandeur have owed their Declension to the same Cause; they had attained a greater Power than they had Wisdom sufficient to direct; for the sake of gratifying the passion of the Day, they lost sight of their lasting Interest.

The utmost rational Aim of our Ambition, is to possess a just Weight, and Consideration in *Europe*; and that the Power of the Nation should be rather respectable than terrible. To effect this, it must not be employed invidiously; it must operate discretely and quietly; then it will be happily felt in its Effects, while it is little seen in violent Exertions. The Genius and Disposition of Nations, as well as Men, is best discerned by the use they make of Power. And therefore my great Objection to this Part of your Plan, does not arise from the Nature of the thing which you desire; my Objection is to the Time and Manner in which you insist on having it done; which is, as I apprehend, to ourselves of no kind of use, and therefore arrogant and unreasonable to the Enemy.

After the Proposal concerning *Dunkirk*, you lay before the Two Great Men the other Parts of your Plan. And here

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you

you recommend it to them to display their Moderation, by giving up *Guadaloupe*, *Senegal*, and *Goree*; and their Wisdom, by keeping the Possession of every Part of *Canada*. To keep *Canada* is the Point you have principally at heart; * “ this is the Point, say you invariably to be adhered to, “ this is to be the *sine qua non* of the Peace,” and unless it is, we shall “ have a *treacherous and delusive Peace*.”

Before I examine the justness of those Motives that make you so strenuously attached to this Object, and so indifferent to every other; I shall beg leave to remark upon the Consequence you deduce from the Supposition of our giving up *Canada*, “ that we shall then have a treacherous and delusive Peace.”

The Views which every State ought to have at the making of Peace, may be reduced to two.

1st. To attain those Objects for which we went to War. And,

2dly. To receive some reasonable

* Vid. p. 34.

Indemnification for the Charges she has incurred, in carrying it on. If she is successful she is justified in making a Demand of this Nature; but without openly avowing some † *Views of Ambition*, no Nation can possibly claim more.

This admitted, Sir; I ask upon the first Head; Whether the Possession of *Canada*, properly so called, was ever one of those Objects for which we began the War? Was it ever mentioned as such in any of our Memorials or Declarations, or in any National or Publick Act whatsoever? The true Cause of the War, our real and indisputable Right, is well known. Our Claims were large enough for Possession and for Security too. And will you say, Sir, that if, in the beginning of these Troubles, *France* influenced by a Dread of the Exertion of the *British* Power, had acknowledged these Claims, had given up *Nova Scotia*, or *Acadia*,

† P. 4. of the Letter. As his Majesty entered into the War *not from views of Ambition*.

P. 33. of the Letter. This Plan is perfectly agreeable to that *Moderation* expressed by his Majesty in his Speech. *Ibid.* *The possession of Canada is no view of Ambition.*

with its ancient and true Boundaries, had demolished their Fort in the Province of *New York*, had removed themselves from the *Ohio* and renounced all claim to that Territory, and that on those Concessions the Ministry had then ceased from Hostilities, without making any further Claims, will you say that we should have had a treacherous and delusive Peace? You will hardly venture to assert that we should. And is a Peace made after *France* has felt the Force of *Britain*, and submitted to that Force, to be more treacherous and delusive than if she had made it from an Apprehension only of the Consequences? Is a Peace to be treacherous and delusive, if we do not get on that Peace, what we never claimed as our Right before the War? Is a Peace treacherous and delusive that puts us in possession of a Territory larger than several flourishing Monarchies? Is a Peace delusive and treacherous only because something is left to the Enemy?

But you do not assert that we have any original Right to *Canada*; nor do you say that the Concession of those Boundaries,

Boundaries which we have claimed do not give us a vast Territory and an advantageous Barrier. You go upon another, which is indeed the only Principle you make use of, but which you are of opinion is so strong * “ as to silence the
 “ *French* Plenipotentiaries, and to convince all *Europe* of the justice of your
 “ demand.”

“ Ask the *French* what Security they
 “ can give you if we restore *Canada*,
 “ however restrained in its Boundaries,
 “ that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expence.”

The *French* Plenipotentiaries, Sir, must be very extraordinary Advocates to be silenced, and *Europe* as extraordinary a Judge to be convinced by such an Argument. *France*, Sir, might answer, that she can give no such Security. No Nation whilst independent can give it. And therefore no such Security should be desired. To desire the Enemies whole Country upon no other Principle but that otherwise you cannot secure your

* P. 3. of the Letter.

own, is turning the Idea of mere Defence into the most dangerous of all Principles. It is leaving no Medium between Safety and Conquest. It is to suppose yourself never safe, whilst your Neighbour enjoys any Security. Indeed such a Demand, after the Questions disputed in the War have been adjusted, is an Avowal of such an unreasonable Ambition, that I trust you will never be seconded in it by any *English* Man or *English* Minister. For it is a Demand that extends infinitely in its Consequences, extends (for any thing I can see to the contrary), to the utter Destruction of Mankind. For whilst we have *France*, or any other Nation on our Borders either in *Europe* or in *America*, we must in the nature of things have frequent Disputes and Wars with them; and we must suppose, at least, as often as we are successful, that the Enemy is in fault; that is, we must suppose the Enemy had provoked us to take Arms by the Violation of some Treaty, or by the Invasion of some Right. The Business of a Peace is to adjust and to determine these Disputes; but after the Enemy has agreed to our original Demands,

mands, if we go on to demand Security for the Preservation of Peace; what less do we demand, than that they should yield themselves bound Hand and Foot up to our Mercy? Let our Borders be ever so extended, as long as we have any Nation near us, we must have the same Disputes, the same Wars, and we must demand, upon your Principle, the same Security at the Conclusion of a Peace, or more properly speaking, we must make such Demands, as will render it absolutely impossible to conclude any Peace at all.

There was a Nation indeed, which I am sure we resemble more in Courage, than in Ambition and Injustice, which frequently used to demand such a Caution: and such a Caution they actually did require from the *Carthaginians*, when they intended it as a Preliminary to the utter Destruction of that People, and to the most notorious Breach of Faith, upon their own side. Their Pretence was exactly yours; that the Enemy was a Nation perfidious to a Proverb; a People whom no Treaty could bind. They used the *Punica* in the same manner that you do the *Gallica Fides*. I need not inform you, Sir, what followed: it was indeed

impossible that such Principles and Pretensions could end in any thing but the total Destruction of the Vanquished.

I do not see why the Arguments you employ concerning a Security for their peaceable Behaviour in *Canada*, would not be equally cogent for requiring the same Security in *Europe*. They are our Neighbours, and dangerous ones, here, as well as there. The *Low Countries*, *Lorain*, *Alsace*, shew us, that the *French* Monarchy has been, at least, as intent upon extending its Dominion in *Europe*, as it can be in *America*. We know that they have tried all the Methods of War, of Treaty, and of Marriages, to enlarge their dangerous Empire. But still, dreaded as they are in *Europe*, (and much more to be dreaded than ever they were in *America*) if we could be so happy to see, what I fear we never shall see, a Confederacy to reclaim their Usurpations, what would we say to the Insolence of those who, on your Principle, should demand all *France* as a Security that they should not make the like Usurpations for the future.

But, Sir, our real Dependence for keeping

ing *France*, or any other Nation, true to her Engagements, must not be in demanding Securities, which no Nation whilst independent can give, but on our own Strength and our own Vigilance.

To say the Truth, we owe our Losses in *America* as much to our own Supineness as to the *French* Perfidy. Our Ministers have heretofore acted in regard to *America*, as if they expected from a Magic in the Contract, that it would perform itself. They took no Steps to enforce it. But from the Wisdom and Vigour of our present Administration, I should expect another Conduct. As soon as *France* is happily reduced to cede us such Boundaries as may be thought proper to demand, the same Spirit that has conducted the War, will maintain the Terms of the Peace. Instead of leaving *France* at liberty to build Forts at her Discretion, *English* Forts will be raised at such Passes, as may at once make us respectable to the *French*, and to the *Indian* Nations. God forbid that we should depend on the Sincerity of our Enemy. Every wise Nation will rely on its own Watchfulness, and on its own Strength,

to

to maintain the Terms they oblige their Enemy to give them; and whoever expects Security from any other Dependence, will find himself the Dupe.

To supply any Defect in your Argument for this favourite Measure, of retaining *Canada*, you call in the Aid of our *American Colonies*; and tell us, "*though Care should be taken to keep all that we have claimed, something more must be done, or our American Colonies will tell you, you have done nothing.*" On what Authority this is so positively asserted to be the Language of our *American Colonies*, you have not told us. I hope and believe that you have been misinformed. But if our *American Colonies* should be so absurd and ungrateful as to tell us, after all the Blood and Treasure expended in their Cause, that we do nothing, if we do not make Conquests for them, they must be taught a Lesson of greater Moderation. If with a Superiority of at least ten to one, with a vast and advantageous Barrier, with the proper Precautions to strengthen it, under the Protection of a great Naval Power, they cannot think themselves secure, they must blame their
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own Cowardice or Ignorance, and not the Measures of their Mother Country; who is bound to provide for their Happiness and Security, but not for their vain Ambition, or their groundless Fears.

The Idea of securing yourself, only by having no other Nation near you, is, I admit, an Idea of *American* Extraction. It is the genuine Policy of Savages; and it is owing to this Policy, that *England* and *France* are able at this Day to dispute the Sovereignty of Deserts in *America*.

As we do not pretend to claim *Canada* upon an original Right, so neither is it necessary to our security. For, that we can very rationally secure ourselves in *North America* without the Possession of *Canada*, will, I apprehend, require very few Arguments to demonstrate. I have already observed upon the vast Superiority of Men which we have there; such Superiority, that I am always astonished when I think on the unaccountable Conduct which has made *France* an Enemy to be apprehended on that Continent. We are in *North America* not only a greater Naval, but a far greater Continental Power. Our Superiority in
Point

Point of Situation is no less visible. If added to these Advantages, we acquire on a Peace all those important Posts and Communications, by which alone *Canada* became in any Degree dangerous to us, I cannot see why *Canada*, weakened, stripped, confined, and I may say bound down, will not be infinitely in more Danger, in case of any Rupture between the two Nations, from our Colonies, than ours can be from theirs.

I cannot help observing, that among all your Ideas of Security, and anxious as you are for the Security of *North America* in particular, you shew little regard to that of the *West Indies*. Our *Caribbee* Islands must ever be infinitely in greater Danger from *Guadaloupe*, than our *North American* Colonies can be from *Canada* circumscribed as it ought, and as it is presumed, it will be. The *French* have a real Superiority in the *West Indies*, and they have at times made it to be severely felt.

If, as it has been shewn, we may beyond any rational Fear secure ourselves without the intire Possession of *Canada*, we can desire it in Preference to our other
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Conquests only on Account of its superior Value. Though you have not at all insisted on this, yet lest this may be thought one of your Motives to that great Preference, and it is sure, the best Motive you could have had, we will consider the Point somewhat at large, and this will bring us to the second of those leading Ideas, that ought to guide a Nation in a Treaty of Peace; that is, *to acquire a proper Indemnification for the Expences of the War.* You are not one of the Number of those who think we ought to give up nothing in a Peace. You do not claim *Canada* on a Principle of Right. We have examined it on the Principle of Security. The only Question that now remains to be disputed between us, is, whether *Canada* be a better Indemnification for the Expences of the War, than all our other Conquests put together; for you give up all the rest with great Ease, and insist on this alone.

Before we enter into a Comparison between the Value of our Acquisitions in the *West Indies* and those in *Canada*, I must beg leave to take some notice of your Reason, your only Reason, for giving

giving up the Island of *Guadaloupe**,
 “ that we have already so many Sugar
 “ Islands of our own.” If any Argument
 could possibly be drawn from our having
 Abundance of Territory, surely it holds
 much more strongly with regard to *North*
America, where one of our Provinces
 alone, has more Land than ours, and all
 the *French* Sugar Islands put together. If
 we have in the *West Indies* Land enough
 for Sugar, surely we have Land enough
 in *North America* for the far less valu-
 able Commodities, which are produced on
 that vast Continent. From what Motives
 you are pleased to think the keeping a
 great Sugar Island an Acquisition of little
 Consequence, I am unable to compre-
 hend. You know surely that in one of
 our Islands, the greatest of them, we
 labour under a sort of Monopoly, and
 under other Disadvantages, hard, if not

P. 33. of the Letter. The Possession of *Guadaloupe*,
 an additional Sugar Island, when we have so many of
 our own, ought not to be insisted upon so strenuously as
 to make it a necessary Condition of the Peace; and
 though *Senegal* and *Goree* are of real Importance in
 the Slave and Gum Trades, our own *African* Settle-
 ments have hitherto supplied us with Slaves sufficient
 for our *American* Purposes.

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impossible to be remedied. You know that another Island, I mean *Barbadoes*, formerly one of our best, is at present much exhausted; so that the Produce, and the Profit made on that Produce, diminishes daily; and that the rest, except perhaps *Antigua*, are quite inconsiderable; so inconsiderable, that the Islands, which as dependents on *Guadaloupe* are scarce mentioned, are much more valuable. It was no sooner found that the King of *Denmark* was intent on settling the Island of *Santa Cruz*, than some considerable Planters immediately removed thither, and it is now almost wholly settled by the *English*. Many have actually Interests in *Martinico*; and *Guadaloupe* was scarce taken, when our Planters flocked thither, and immediately made conditional § Purchases, sensible of the Superiority of this Island and the Defects of our own.

In Consequence of those Wants, and

§ I say *conditional*, because the Capitulation has rendered it impossible to make an absolute Purchase; but they have already made Contracts to purchase, if the Island remains to us, and have taken possession of Plantations by virtue of such Contracts.

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Disadvantages, our Sugar Islands produce little more than what serves the home Consumption ; and that too at a very advanced Price. From the foreign Market we have before this War been almost wholly excluded. *France* supplied all the Markets of *Europe*, and supplied them in a great measure from the Produce of this very Island, which you esteem so lightly. When we consider Things in a Commercial Light, it is the foreign Market which ought certainly to have the greatest Influence. Those who supply the home Consumption purvey to our Luxury : those who supply the foreign Market administer to our Wealth and to our Power.

To shew you, Sir, how much the Sugar Trade might contribute to the Wealth and Power of any Nation, by what it formerly did contribute to ours, and what for a long Time past it has contributed to that of *France*, I will lay before you some Facts ; Facts, Sir, which are of a Nature infinitely more convincing than the most lively Sallies of Eloquence. About the time of the Treaty of *Utrecht* we supplied the greatest part
of

of the Sugar Consumption throughout *Europe*. *France*, far from contending with us in the foreign Market, took from us a great part of what she used at home. From the year 1715 to 1719 we exported one Year with another 18580 Hogsheads of Sugar. From 1719 to 1722 we fell to less than half; for we sent abroad but 9064 *communibus Annis*. We continued regularly on the decrease to 1739, in which Year our Sugar Export had fallen to 4078 Hogsheads. Since that time, it has fallen almost to nothing. Now let us turn the other side, and view the Sugar Trade of *France* since the same Period, the Treaty of *Utrecht*. At that time the *French* exported no Sugars. But mark, Sir, the Revolution. In 1740, when the *British* Trade in that Article was in a manner annihilated; *France*, after serving her Home Consumption at a very easy Rate, exported no less than 80,000 Hogsheads of Sugar, which, with the Gains of the Commission, &c. was reputed to be worth to *France* more than a Million Sterling, to employ 40,000 Ton of Shipping, and 4000 Seamen, solely in bringing it from the *West Indies* to *Europe*. These, Sir, are Facts that proclaim loudly the Advantage of those Islands to *France* whilst they were in her Possession; and

declare no less strongly the Advantages which must accrue to *Britain*, if she could attain the Possession of one of the very best of them. Facts these, that ought not to be passed lightly, until you can shew something like them, in favour of the Plan you so warmly embrace. I therefore Sir, cannot help thinking that your Reasons for rejecting *Guadaloupe*, on the Principle of *our having Sugar Land enough*, are not near so strong, nor the Matter so well weighed, as the Importance of the Question deserves.

But let us see what the Value of this *Canada* is, in Comparison of which you reject all our other Acquisitions.

Unluckily for your Argument, you yourself inform * us at your setting out, that the *French* set very little Value upon this Possession, and that they have even deliberated, whether it should not be entirely abandoned.

If in the Hands of the *French*, who have no other Northern Colony, from whence to supply their Islands with

* P. 30, and 33.

Lumber,

Lumber, Corn, and Provision, *Canada* was of so very little Importance, what is it like to prove in ours, who have already such immense Tracts, and those too so much more conveniently situated for that Trade, and who can easily supply five times the Consumption of ours, theirs, and all the other *West India* Islands put together; and that too at a much easier Rate than they can possibly have these Things from *Canada*? But I do not insist upon this Argument, though it is strong against you, because I do not believe that *France* has such a disregard for this their only considerable Possession in *North America*. It is a great while since they thought of giving it up; and they are long convinced that it is of some use to them, independent of their Hopes of encroaching on our Possessions. Ask those, Sir, who lately saw *Canada*, if it had the Face of a Colony which the Mother Country was weary of holding? I believe, Sir, they will tell you that the Cultivation of the Lands, the Number and Neatness of the Houses, the warm Condition of the Inhabitants, by no Means seemed to imply that they were neglected by *France*; but evinced rather that this Colony was the Object of her very tender Concern.

But there are, independent of the Opinion or Designs of *France*, many Reasons why we should not think *Canada* so valuable an Acquisition as our Conquest in the *West Indies*. *Canada*, situated in a cold Climate, produces no Commodity, except Furs and Skins, which she can exchange for the Commodities of *Europe*; and consequently she can have small Returns to make to the *English* Merchant. We know what trifling Returns we have, from some of our own very flourishing Colonies in *America*. The whole Trade of Furs and Skins, which *Canada* carried on with *France*, fell short, in its most flourishing State, of 140,000l. a Year. The rest of their Produce, with regard to the Market of *Europe*, is as nothing. It is worthy of observation, that a very great Part of the Value of those Furs was returned from *France* in the Article of Brandy, without which, the Trade with the *Indians* for their Beaver and Deer Skins could not be carried on. But as an *English* Plantation, *Canada* must supply itself, as all the other *English* Plantations do, with Rum; else they will be obliged intirely to relinquish the Fur and Peltry Trade, which is the only valuable Trade they have. But let it be considered how the

the People of *Canada* can come to the *West India* Market from the bottom of the River *St. Laurence*, with the gross and cheap Article of Lumber and Corn, on a footing with our Colonies, many of which are not three Weeks Sail from the *Leeward* Islands. They could neither trade with *Europe*, nor with the *West Indies*, with any tolerable Advantage : not with the *West Indies*, because they must be undersold in that Market ; not with *Europe*, because being so undersold they cannot have the Rum that is necessary for the *Indian* Trade, which keeps up their Commerce with *Europe*.

Indeed whilst *Canada* is in the Hands of *France*, the Skin Trade may be kept up so as to be an Object ; because the Return for those Commodities, brings back the Brandy with which they are purchased : and thus the Trade is kept alive by a continual Circulation. The bulkier Articles of Corn and Lumber may likewise continue a Branch of their Trade, because it is their Interest to support by every Method the Vent of these Articles in their *West India* Islands in Preference to Foreigners. But *Canada* in our Hands can have no such Preference, and

and therefore from its Situation cannot be on an Equality in the *West India* Market; from which Market alone it is, that they, as a *British* Possession, can derive the Spirits, or those Materials for Spirits, without which the Fur and Peltry, their only Trade, must certainly perish. These Principles appear to me so well grounded, that I think it no Presumption to prophesy, "if that Place should ever be ours, the Fur Trade of *Canada* must inevitably come to little or nothing in a few Years.

But let us extend our View a little farther; let us suppose that instead of aiming at the entire Possession of *North America*, we confine ourselves to those Limits which we have always claimed there; and that *Canada* is restored to *France*, curtailed in such a manner as to secure the *Ohio* Country, and the Communication of the Lakes. It is well known to those who have any Knowledge of *American* Affairs, that the Country to the Southward of Lake *Erie*, and near the *Ohio*, is the greatest *Indian* Hunting Country in *North America*. If this Territory should remain with us on a Peace, it naturally draws to us all that Trade which

which depends upon the Hunting of Deer and Beaver. If this Country should be further secured to us, by the Possession of *Niagara*, which is a Post of infinite Importance, and intirely commands the great Lakes of *Erie* and *Ontario*, I cannot see how it is possible to keep the far greater Part of the Commerce of *North America* out of our Hands. The *Indians* must every where be intercepted before they can arrive at the *French* Colony, even supposing (what can never be) that the *French* could entice them thither by selling cheaper than our Dealers.

Thus without aiming at the total Possession of *Canada*, by establishing proper Limits, and by securing them properly, we may draw to ourselves a great Part of that Trade which must give *Canada* itself any Value, in the Eyes of a commercial Nation.

So that the Question, Sir, is not, whether *Canada* extended to the Ocean by a Possession of the River *St. John*, and a great Part of *Nova Scotia*, encroaching upon, and menacing *New York* and *New England*, commanding exclusively all the

Lakes and Rivers, whether such a Country ought to be kept in Preference to *Guadaloupe*, but whether *Canada*, stripped of these Advantages, and confined to its proper Limits, confined to the *Northward* of those Lakes, and Rivers, be a better Acquisition than our rich Conquest in the *West Indies*.

If we compare the Returns of *Canada*, even whilst it flourished most by its Encroachments upon us, with those of *Guadaloupe*, we shall find their Value in no Degree of Competition. The Fur Trade, whose Value is before mentioned, is its whole Trade to *Europe*. But *Guadaloupe*, besides the great Quantities of Sugars, Cotton, Indigo, Coffee, and Ginger, which it sends to Market, carries on a Trade with the *Caracca's* and other Parts of the *Spanish* Main, which is a Trade wholly in the Manufactures of *Europe*, and the Returns for which, are made almost wholly in ready Money. Without estimating the Land, the Houses, the Works, and the Goods in the Island, the Slaves, at the lowest Valuation, are worth upwards of one Million two hundred and fifty thousand Pounds sterling. It is a known Fact that they make more
Sugar

Sugar in *Guadaloupe*; than in any of our Islands, except *Jamaica*. This Branch of their Trade alone, besides the Employment of so much Shipping, and so many Seamen, will produce clear 300,000 l. *per Annum* to our Merchants. For, as we have sufficient from our own Islands, to supply our Home Consumption, the whole Sugar Produce of *Guadaloupe* will necessarily be exported: and will consequently be so much clear Money to *Great Britain*. Sir, the whole Produce of *Canada*, though it were all exported from *England*, and exported compleatly *manufactured*, would not amount to the Value of that single Article *unmanufactured*: nor would it employ the one twentieth Part of the Shipping, and the Seamen. But this, though the largest, and the most valuable, is not the only Produce of *Guadaloupe*; Coffee, which in our Islands is a very inconsiderable Object, is there a very great one. They raise likewise great Quantities of Indigo and Cotton, which supply Materials for our best and most valuable Manufactures, and which employ many more Hands than the Increase of the Hat Trade, proposed by the keeping *Canada*, can do. This Island is capable in our Hands,
of

of being improved to double its present Value; whereas *Canada* in our Hands would not probably yield half what it did to *France*.

There is, Sir, one Argument I would use particularly to you, who are so strongly sensible of the Inconveniences we are liable to, from the Situation of *Dunkirk*. Surely there is not a single Word you say, in respect to *Dunkirk*, that does not hold as strongly in regard to *Guadaloupe*, situated in the very Heart of our *Leeward* Islands, and there infesting one of the most advantageous Branches of the *British* Commerce. If I may be allowed the Expression, *Guadaloupe* is the *Dunkirk* of the *West Indies*. It is not to be denied but that the *English* Coaster and the *London* Trader has suffered by the *Dunkirk* Privateers; but their Losses this War have not been near so considerable as that of the *West Indies*, and above all of the *North American* Traders, whose Interest, I believe, you will not dispute to be of some Importance. Ask, Sir, the *North American* Traders, ask the People of the *Leeward* Islands, what a vast Security they thought it to their Trade, that *Guadaloupe* should be in our Hands? Our Islands were so annoyed
from

from thence; that they scarce considered it in any other Light than as a Nest of Privateers : those who went thither from our Settlements were surpris'd to find a People richer than in any of our own Islands; and Land so much better than their own, that many of our rich Planters have already made † conditional Purchases there.

Not to confine our Views solely to a Commercial Point, give me leave to mention one great Advantage, that in a political light may arise from our Possession of *Guadaloupe*. It is very well known that the Hand of Government is heavy on the Protestants of *France*. Many of these People are already established in this Island, and they have Connexions of every Kind with those of their own Persuasion at Home. And may we not hope and expect that this may be an Inducement to many others, to make this their Retreat, and that the Colony may be enriched and strengthened at the expence of *France*.

In short, Sir, in whatever light you view the Island of *Guadaloupe*, you will

† Vid. Page 31, the Note.

find it a most valuable and a most desirable Object. Do you ask to deprive your Enemy of an advantageous Post, from whence he might materially molest your Trade in Time of War? Do you wish to extend your Trade in Time of Peace, and to have a new Market for all your Manufactures? From being scarce able to supply the Home Consumption with Sugar, do you desire to be foremost at the foreign Market? This Island, Sir, of *Guadaloupe*, that you esteem so little, will answer all these Ends; Ends so material, that I trust, Sir, the Stone you have rejected, will be made the Corner Stone in the Temple of Peace.

I must therefore repeat it, Sir, that I am not a little surprized you should pass over in a manner so careless, and with such extreme Superficiality, a Point so very material and interesting as this, and tell us that * “the Possession of *Guadaloupe*,
 “ *an additional Sugar Island, when we have*
 “ *so many of our own, ought not to be so*
 “ *strenuously insisted upon as to make it a*
 “ *necessary Condition of the Peace.*” Had

* P. 33.

you

you taken the Pains to inform yourself of the Facts necessary for making a Judgment on this Matter, or had you duly attended to them, you could not possibly have said that it was not to be insisted upon, and in the same Breath assert, that without *Canada* we should have a treacherous and delusive Peace.

You say a great deal, and with Reason, upon the Value of our * *North American* Colonies, and the great Increase our Trade has had from that Quarter. But you pass by with very little notice, how much both the Trade of *England*, and even the Trade of these very *North American* Colonies, owes to the Islands.

You look upon these Islands only as an inferior dependent Part of the *British* Plantations, which you scarce think worth while to mention; but because I think you are under some mistake in this Point,

* Vid Pag. 34 of the Letter. If notwithstanding our having lost several Branches of Commerce we formerly enjoyed, in *Europe* and to the *Levant*, we have still more Commerce than ever, a greater Demand for our Manufactures, and a vast Increase, of our Shipping, what can this be owing to but to the Trade of our own *American* Colonies?

in

in addition to those Reasons which have been given to shew the Preference of *Guadaloupe* in particular to *Canada*, there are some Facts, which I beg leave to submit to your Observation, concerning *Settlements* on the Continent of *North America* and Plantations in the *West Indian* Islands. Though it may be a new Idea, I shall not hesitate to say, that an *Island Colony*, is always more advantageous than a Continental one, for the Mother Country, as being more attached by their Interest, and more easily supported.

The Inhabitants of the *West Indian* Islands never consider themselves as at home there; they send their Children to the Mother Country for Education; they themselves make many Trips to the Mother Country to recover their Health or enjoy their Fortunes; if they have Ambition, 'tis hither they come to gratify it. I need not, I suppose, observe to you, how many Gentlemen of the *West Indies* have Seats in the *British* House of Commons. I might I believe venture to say, there are very few who have inherited Plantations in any of our Islands, who have not had an *European* Education, or at least have not spent some Time in this Kingdom.

Kingdom. Many who have Plantations, receive and spend the whole Profits of them here, without ever seeing the *West Indies*. If the Commerce with the *West Indian* Islands had even been in some respects against us, this Circumstance alone would turn the Ballance in our favour; but this in truth is very far from being the Case. The Trade we carry on with that Part of the World, is as happily circumstanced as Imagination could form it. The *West India* Islands lie in a Climate different totally from ours. The natural Produce therefore interferes in no respect with that of *England*. Their Produce is only such, as our Taste and the Turn of our Manners call for. Indeed a great Article of that Produce enters so much into the ordinary Food of all Ranks of our People, that if we had it not from our own Colonies, we should be under a necessity of purchasing it from Strangers. The Commerce between the Mother Country and a *West Indian* Island is natural and easy: it needs in no respect to be forced or managed; they are mutually formed for each other: neither is there any sort of fear that the Islands in that part of the World should ever make this Commerce less easy or less advantageous.

tageous. The extreme Dearness of Provision will never suffer them, how much soever they may be inclined, to set up any Manufacture which may interfere with our own. So that these Colonies, by their very Nature, Situation, and Products, by what they have, and by what they want, are kept necessarily connected with and dependent upon *England*, and must ever be so, as long as we are able to protect them.

Let us now examine, Sir, whether the greatest part of the Plantations which we possess or desire in *North America*, can come in competition with the Islands, either in the Advantages we derive from them, or in the Certainty of holding those Advantages. With regard to the Estates in *North America* spent in *England*, I may affirm that from *Nova Scotia* to *Maryland* and *Virginia* there are absolutely none; yet in this Tract are, the four Provinces of *New England*, the great Countries of *New York*, *Pennsylvania*, and the two *Jerseys*, Places highly flourishing in Commerce, and abounding with People: even to the Southward of this Line there are very few Estates spent in *England*.

In

In *North America* the Climate is not unfavourable to an *European* Constitution, and it is a Country in which Men fond of Rural Diversions may pass their time agreeably. The truth is, though their Estates supply them abundantly to live at home, they do not furnish Money enough to send them abroad. I do not remember that this vast Continent supplies our House of Commons with a single Member.

To view the Continent of *America* in a Commercial Light, the Produce of all the Northern Colonies is the same as that of *England*, Corn and Cattle: and therefore, except for a very few naval Stores, there is but little Trade from thence directly to *England*. Their own Commodities bear a very low Price, Goods carried from *Europe* bear a very high Price; and thus they are of Necessity driven to set up Manufactures similar to those of *England*, in which they are favoured by Cheapness of Provisions. In fact, there are Manufactures of many Kinds in these Northern Colonies, that promise in a short Time to supply their Home Consumption. From *New England* they begin even to export some things manufactured, particularly Hats, in some Quantity. In

these Provinces they have Colleges and Academies for the Education of their Youth; and as they increase daily in People and in Industry, the Necessity of a Connection with *England*, with which they have no natural Intercourse by a Reciprocation of Wants, will continually diminish. But as they recede from the Sea, all these Causes will operate more strongly; they will have nothing to expect from Commerce, they must live wholly on their own Labour, and in process of Time will know little, enquire little, and care little about the Mother Country.

If, Sir, the People of our Colonies find no Check from *Canada*, they will extend themselves, almost, without bounds into the Inland Parts. They are invited to it by the Pleasantness, the Fertility, and the Plenty of that Country; and they will increase infinitely from all these Causes. What the Consequence will be, to have a numerous, hardy, independent People, possessed of a strong Country, communicating little, or not at all with *England*, I leave to your own Reflections. I hope we have not gone to these immense Expences, without any Idea of securing the Fruits of them to Posterity. If we have, I am sure we have acted with little Fru-

gality or Foresight. This is indeed a Point that must be the constant Object of the Minister's Attention, but is not a fit Subject for a publick Discussion. I will therefore expatiate no farther on this Topic; I shall only observe, that by eagerly grasping at extensive Territory, we may run the risque, and that perhaps in no very distant Period, of losing what we now possess. The Possession of *Canada*, far from being necessary to our Safety, may in its Consequence be even dangerous. A Neighbour that keeps us in some Awe, is not always the worst of Neighbours. So that far from sacrificing *Guadaloupe* to *Canada*, perhaps if we might have *Canada* without any Sacrifice at all, we ought not to desire it.

We ought in all Reason to be as attentive to our internal Government in *America*, as to that outward Security for which you are so anxious, but for which you have proposed a Plan defective in Point of Expediency and Justice, and even defective upon those mistaken Principles of Security on which you build. For if we can have no Security whilst the *French* have any Place from whence they may invade our Colonies, you ought to have carried your Demands still fur-

ther ; you ought to have demanded the whole Country of *Louisiana* ; because from thence, if we are only to reason from our Fears, *France* undoubtedly may invade our Colonies, and what is of more Consideration the weakest of our Colonies, those to the *Southward*. If the Fear of such an Invasion be, as it is, your only Reason for demanding *Canada*, you have not demanded enough, and your Plan is as defective upon your own Principles, as it is excessive on Principles of Moderation and Equity.

But these Points are not to be discussed between *France* and *England* only. There are other Powers who will probably think themselves interested in the Decision of this Affair. There is a Balance of Power in *America* as well as in *Europe*, which will not be forgotten ; and this is a Point I should have expected would somewhat have engaged your Attention.

With regard to *Senegal* and *Goree*, I concur with you in not making them the principal Object of our Negotiations at the Congress * for a Peace ; but it is up-

* P. 33. *Senegal* and *Goree*, though of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own

on Principles very different from yours. You despise the *African* Trade, and consistently enough, because you lay little weight on that of the *West Indies*, which is supported by it; but the Reduction of the Price of Slaves, the whole Trade of Gum thrown into our Hands, and the Increase in that of Gold and Ivory, would make even those Places a far better Purchase than *Canada*, as might possibly be shewn without much difficulty. But I do not insist upon it, because I think we ought to be as moderate in the Terms of Peace, as is consistent with a reasonable Indemnification, and because too I know in the Nature of Things, that it is impossible to retain all. In one word, I will not venture, Sir, to say, *we have a treacherous and delusive Peace*, unless that Peace is made in Conformity to my Ideas; for there may be Reasons that neither you, nor I, Sir, can possibly be acquainted with, which may make these Points not proper to be insisted upon; but I will take upon me, Sir, to say, that if by

African Settlements have hitherto supplied us with Slaves sufficient for our *American* Purposes; and the Gum Trade is not perhaps of Consequence enough to make us amends for the annual Mortality which we already lament of our brave Countrymen to guard our *African* Conquests.

this War we gain *Guadaloupe*, we make as great an Acquisition as ever this Nation has made by any Treaty or any War, and if it is possible to retain this, we need not ask for more.

At a Congress, Sir, in the Face of that August Assembly, formed by the Representatives of the Christian World, we shall there exhibit ourselves in our real Character; we shall there shew all the Powers of *Europe* what they are to expect from us, and how far they ought to wish the Continuance and Increase of our Greatness. Therefore any shew of arrogant Superiority, any unmeasurable Claim, any avaricious Grasping, though they may seem immediately to fall upon *France*, are in effect Menaces to every other Power. But if Moderation is necessary there, when the War is ended, and when we act as a Nation, how much more necessary is it to private Men, whilst the War still continues with that Uncertainty, which must always attend the most prosperous Fortune. You cannot forget in this very Year, what an Aspect our Affairs in *Germany* wore, before the glorious Battle of *Minden*; and you cannot be ignorant how much this would have affected us in a Negotiation for Peace. Things are

not yet decided there ; they look indeed favourable, but not favourable enough, either with regard to his Majesty's Army, and still less with regard to the King of *Prussia*, to entitle you to prescribe Terms in the Stile of a *Roman Dictator*, even if any Fortune could entitle you to do so. Let us, Sir, use a little Moderation in our happy Hour, that we may at all Events preserve an Uniformity of Conduct, and not seem to act meanly, if any reverse of Fortune should *oblige* us to be moderate. *France*, Sir, though beaten in all Quarters of the World, defeated both by Sea and Land ; though the Credit of her Arms and her Finances are impaired, she is not yet totally ruined : nor, as I conceive, brought so low as she was in the War of *Queen Anne*. Yet, Sir, you will be pleased to remember, that by the haughty Demeanor, the unreasonable Expectations, the arrogant, I may say, ridiculous Demands of the Allies, the happy Hour for making Peace on the most advantageous Conditions was suffered to escape ; until Faction had Time to raise its Head in *England*, the Posture of Affairs to change Abroad, and the Fortune of the War to vary in so many Particulars, that the Result of all our Success and Arrogance was — the Treaty

of *Utrecht*. The *M. de Torcy's* Memoirs give a lively Picture of this Conduct and all its Consequences.

I have, Sir, attentively, and I hope it will be allowed fairly, examined your principal Arguments. You will give me leave now to observe a little upon some Things of less Consequence, which I ye detached from one another through out your Performance.

I respect the Zeal which you shew for the Interest of your Country : but I think that Zeal has transported you much too far in your Reflections on the Conduct and Capacities of our Nobility. We allow the Affluence of their Fortunes has betrayed many into a life of Dissipation ; we allow that Luxury is the natural consequence of Riches ; consult the History of Mankind you will find, this has been the complaint of all Ages and all Countries : the Complaint was perhaps never made in any Age or Country with less reason than in ours. The very Nature of our Constitution obliges our Nobility to be in some sort Men of Business. Many of them are Men of extensive Knowledge, and profound Learning ; in short, to be absolutely ignorant, or idle, is not

the fashion of the times. Every Man exerts himself in some degree, and where that is the case, some Talents must appear. We have in fact found, that notwithstanding the faults, which, whether justly or unjustly, have been imputed to us, we have not wanted Heads or Hands to direct and execute our Military Operations. Why should we then apprehend that the Genius of our Country will forsake us at the moment that we are to reap the Benefit of all our Successes, at our entrance into a Negotiation for Peace.

This War is principally, with regard to us at least, an *American* War. When I consider this, I own my Eyes are led, as I believe those of most Persons are, to the few who from their Inclinations, their Studies, their Opportunities, and their Talents, are made perfectly Masters of the State and Interests of our Colonies. Nor can we, when we cast our Eye on the noble Person to whom we owe the judicious Settlement of that frontier Colony, whose Capital gratefully bears the Title of its Founder, by any Means despair of an able Plenipotentiary at a Congress, where for the first Time, our own national Interest will be the principal Object of Negotiation.

I admire, Sir, with you, the noble Struggle which that great Prince our Ally in this War, has made against such a Combination of great Powers as meant to destroy him. I could wish for his Virtues, and profess I almost expect from his Abilities, that he will still extricate himself from all the Toils that surround him.

It must, however, be remembered, that it is not to his Connection with us, that he owes his Distress. His Dominions have not, like the Electorate of *Hanover*, in resentment of *Great Britain*, been ravaged by * *the Contributions of the rapacious Rich-lieu*, or been marked out for the *Military Desert of Belleisle*. He has not, like the unhappy Prince of *Hesse*, been twice driven out of his Country for adhering firmly to *Great Britain*, and in a Quarrel intirely *British*. We found him beset with Enemies, our Interests coincided, we made an Alliance, I am sure he has already found in *Great Britain* a most useful Ally, and I believe he always will find in her an Ally faithful to her Engagements. But, Sir, there is a bound to every thing, † *Let us, in your own Words, learn for the future to prefer our own Interest to that of others; to proportion our Expences on the*

* P. 39. of the Letter. † Ibid. p. 42.

Continent to the immediate Expences of our own Country, and never to assist a New Ally without remembering how much we did for our Old one, and what return we have had. We see plainly, Sir, by the Conduct of Great Britain at this Hour, that the Ministry is not inclined to let this Prince fall for want of a due Assistance; but sure while we assist him so materially in Europe, we are not bound to sacrifice our Interests in every other Part of the World. It may be a † *popular Doctrine*, but I hope, it is not a Doctrine that will be received.

* Enthusiasm, Sir, is a noble Motive to Action, but good Sense and Knowledge only must direct the Business of a Negotiation. The Protestant Cause maintained itself before the King of Prussia was considered as its Protector;

† P. 40, 41. of the Letter. I would inculcate a *Doctrine* which I think will not be *unpopular*, and which therefore, I hope, will not be opposed by our Ministers, that *whatever Conquest* we have made, and *whatever Conquest* we may still make upon the *French*, except *North America*, which must be kept all our own, should be looked upon as given back to *France* for a valuable Consideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Prussia from any unforeseen Distresses.

* P. 41. of the Letter. Perhaps my Notions on this Subject border on *Enthusiasm*: the Ruin of the King of Prussia will be soon followed by the Ruin of the Protestant Religion in the *Empire*.

and I trust it will still be able to support itself independent of him ; it will indeed always find a surer Support in the jarring Interest of the several Powers of *Europe*, which will certainly never cease, than in the Faith of any Prince, which will be always subject to change.

Many material Circumstances of that famous † Opposition in our Parliament to which you allude, are indeed but little known. It is a Period about which no man is uninquisitive. Your Description of the Medley which composed that Opposition, is spirited, lively, and I doubt not, just : If you were yourself engaged in that Struggle, *when you had driven the common Enemy to the Wall*, whether you found it convenient at that Time to quit your Friends, or whether you thought yourself deserted by them, Time enough is now elapsed to have forgotten political Friendships, and perhaps too, to have worn out Party Resentments ; and in an Age so fond of Anecdotes, and so curious in Characters, I may venture to assure you nothing will be more acceptable than a *true History of that whole Transaction*.

† P. 35. of the Letter, vide Note. The true History of this Transaction here alluded to, may possibly some time or other appear ; though, as yet, we are persuaded that the World knows very little of it.

It was indeed no undesirable Time to have lived in, when a Field was opened for every Man to display his Abilities; and exert his Talents; if we give the Reins to our Ambition, we should, Sir, regret that where *so many skillful Champions used formerly to engage and struggle for Victory, one Man should at this Day remain single in the Field of Battle.* But alas, Sir, however mortifying this may be to us as Men; surely as citizens we must rejoice that the great Man, to whose active Spirit we in a great measure owe all our Glory, our Success, I had almost said our very Safety, is able to employ his whole time against the Enemies of his Country, without giving a Moment's Care to provide for his own Safety. If we consider it, in this Light, Sir, sure it must be a most pleasing Contemplation to think, that **“the Extinction of factious Opposition, the Unanimity of every Party, and the Acquiescence of every Connection, in whatever Scheme is proposed by his Majesty's Servants,”* suffer † *the Speaker without the least Debate or Opposition to take the Chair, only to vote Millions, and levy Thousands;* we have the Comfort however to see that these Millions are voted, and these Thousands levied, not for the support of a Cabal,

* P. 2. of the Letter. † Vid. the Letter. Pag. 2.

or the nursing of a Faction, but for asserting the Honour and the Interest of our Country.

Have a little Patience, Sir, we shall soon, hope, have reduced our Enemies, to reason and then we shall perhaps again have leisure to quarrel among ourselves; we may again see more than one Champion in the Field; we may then list under that Banner, to which our Interest or our Passions may direct us.

In the mean time, let us thank Providence for the present happy Situation of our Affairs. Every Man should, as far as he can, endeavour to encourage that conciliatory Disposition, to cherish that Concord and Union, which is at present so advantageous to our Country; and every Head of a Party must for this have a share in our Acknowledgments for his Acquiescence.

But you have drawn the public Attention upon the two great Persons whom you address. The noble Lord has great Merit both with his Country and his Prince. His early Zeal cannot be forgotten. His extensive Influence, his personal Authority, exerted as they have been, and as I believe they always will

be, for the Good of his Country, will always challenge the good Opinion of his Countrymen. Nor will our Country forget to do justice to the active Spirit of that great Man, to whose unwearied Efforts *Great Britain* is so much indebted for her present Glory; to whom you and I, Sir, owe it, that in a War with such a Power as *France* we now debate whether our Country should use Moderation. I mean not, Sir, to make any Comparison, for it is not now a Time to draw the nice Line between the Merits of great Men, or to ascertain exactly where the Merit of the one ends, and the other begins. Comparisons are always invidious; they might at this Time be hurtful, and tend to weaken the Bonds that unite so many Interests apparently discordant in the Service of their Country.

It was no Spirit of Contradiction, Sir, that made me take the pains of answering your Letter; therefore as I canvass with Freedom those Points which appear to me to be mistaken, so with great Pleasure I join Hands where I think what you say is just and reasonable. I agree with you intirely in your Judgment of a Place Bill, which would, I believe, be more effectual, if not made too violent in its

first Operation like an * *Oliverian* self-denying Ordinance. Your Judgment on Mediators is surely just and sensible; and we may believe the Ministry think so, who have not employed any Mediation, though they have offered to treat with our Enemies.

I must now ask yours and the public Indulgence for any Mistakes. I have not willingly perverted or misrepresented any thing. I do not pretend to the Credit of a Writer, but I have endeavoured to understand the Question I write upon, as I think every Man is bound to do who troubles the Public with his Opinions. If I am mistaken in what I advance, it does not much signify who the Author of wrong Notions may be. If my Opinions are well grounded, and my Remarks just, my Country may receive some Benefit from them; and if she receives a Benefit, it is of little Concern by what Hand it is administered.

I am, S I R,

Yours, &c. &c.

* Pag. 48. of the Letter.

F I N I S.

POSTSCRIPT.

I Am obliged to the Publick for the candid and favourable reception they have given to the foregoing Remarks. I was sensible that I opposed myself in some Points, to the prevailing Passions and prejudices of the People. I did not attempt in point of Eloquence and Spirit to vie with the Performance I undertook to examine. If therefore I have removed any Impressions raised by that Letter, which every where tended to confirm those Prejudices, and to inflame those Passions, I can only attribute it to the irresistible Force of Truth, and to the Equity and Moderation of the Sentiments I endeavoured to inspire. In these alone I can pretend to come into any Competition with the Author of the Letter to the Two Great Men.

Since the printing off this Edition I have been informed that a Gentleman, to whose Opinion I pay great Deference, does not think I have allowed sufficient Weight to the Lumber Trade of *Canada*; and again, that in considering our Decay in the foreign Trade of Sugars, since the Peace of *Utrecht*, I have, he thinks, not enough attended to the vast Increase of the Home Consumption, which he supposes

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to

to be the true Cause of the Decay of the foreign Trade.

I am much obliged to the Gentleman for the Observations; they are indeed Circumstances, upon which I ought to have been more explicit. That the Increase of the Home Consumption is one Cause why we have lost the Foreign Market, I readily admit. I have not any where said, that our Sugar Produce since the Period I mentioned, is at all diminished; on the contrary, I have reason to know it is considerably increased; but then it has only increased in proportion to our own Wants, and not at all in proportion to the Foreign Demand. The Foreign Trade we have clearly lost. Nay to speak plain, we do not entirely supply our own Markets; a great Part, if not far the greatest Part of the Sugar consumed in *Ireland*, comes from *Portugal*. But *France*, from the Period I mentioned, has increased her Produce not only in proportion to her Home Consumption, which as well as ours is much enlarged, but in proportion also to the Foreign Demand, which has increased in the same manner all over *Europe*. From being unable to furnish her own, she has supplied all the Markets which were formerly in our hands.

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I observed this Fact, I lamented it, and I proposed a Plan in some measure to remove it, a Plan which might make us share at least some Part of the Market with *France*. The Addition of a new Sugar Island, I do not say probably will, but actually must let us into this Market in proportion to its Produce. We can know if we please to the utmost Exactness, what the Sugar Produce of *Guadaloupe* was before the War, and then we may know with equal Exactness what we shall have to export if we keep this Island, and what Advantages *Great Britain* must certainly reap by that Acquisition. All this depends on Facts; any thing else is uncertain, and in Speculation at best. We do not know, that by any Scheme for the further Culture of our own Islands, we can produce more than Sugar enough for our Home Consumption: Nay, we know almost beyond a doubt, that they never will produce much more, because our *Caribbee* Islands are cultivated to the utmost Extent; and as for *Jamaica*, that Island has not near so much Land fit for Sugar, and convenient for Exportation, as is generally imagined; and if it had, yet it is the Interest of all the Planters there, to keep things on their

present Footing ; for they avoid harrassing, and wearing out their Land, they bring it gradually into Culture, they keep up the Price, and they gain a very large Profit on their Stock. That they reason in this manner is evident, because the Produce of *Jamaica* has been many years nearly at the same Point. I believe we shall find it very difficult to make any Change in this Particular; and I own I do not expect great Matters from any Scheme which depends for its Success, on making many People relinquish what they imagine to be their Interest.

As to Lumber, whoever considers the Extent of our Colonies in *America*, their Situation, and the extreme Woodiness of the Soil in most of them, will easily see that they can more than supply all the *West Indies* with that Article, and will probably be able so to do for Centuries to come. Tho' it was the Interest of *France* by every means to encourage the Trade of Lumber from *Canada*, yet *Canada*, favoured as it was, never was able to supply the *French* Islands, which are almost wholly furnished with Lumber from our Colonies: and if with all the Encouragement of the Mother Country,

Country, *Canada* was not able to supply the *French* Islands, I should imagine she could have less chance of succeeding in that Trade, if in our Possession, as she could not then hope for any particular Indulgences. The Lumber is a very gross Article, and attended with very small Profits; and it is absolutely necessary the Freight should be extremely light, which from such a Distance as the habitable part of *Canada* is from the *West Indies*, it could not possibly be; and this is perhaps the reason why we in *England* have never been able to supply ourselves with Deals and Naval Stores in any Quantity from our Colonies.

Upon all these Considerations taken together, my Opinion for keeping of *Guadaloupe* in preference to *Canada* was founded; for having secured those Bounds which were the primary Object of the War, I imagined that there was a Point in which, whilst we secured an Indemnification from our Conquest, the *French* and we might have Advantages in some measure reciprocal, and that thus we might make a Peace agreeable at once to Equity and to our Interest. For the *French* abound, and we are deficient in the *West Indies*; the case is reversed in *North Ame-*

America; and the Proposal of retaining *Guadaloupe* and leaving to them a part of *Canada*, is perhaps the only Point in which, I supposed, and I hope proved, that the *French* can give us what they want less than we do, and receive in return what is far less advantageous to us than it will be to them. I must own it appeared to me to be the happiest Ground in the World for a Peace, the way to which I thought, and still think, ought to be as little perplexed with Difficulties as possible. I thought this more expedient, equitable, and practicable, than the Plan proposed in the Letter.

I have thus attempted to answer these two Objections. For when Men of Knowledge and Candour do me the honour to observe upon any part of my Argument, I shall always think myself bound to examine their Objections with the utmost Attention; if they appear to me well grounded, I shall think it no Shame to retract my Opinions publicly; if they do not convince me, I shall think my time cannot be better employed than in endeavouring to remove them. But it would be a very improvident waste of my own and my Readers leisure, to take the trouble of answering Objections of another Stile

and Character; such are those inserted in the Gentleman's Magazine, which arise from a total Ignorance of the Subject, and from an entire Misunderstanding or Perversion of my Notions, from the Beginning to the End of the Paper.

When I ventured to trouble the Publick with my Observations, I was persuaded that in deliberating a Plan for Pacification, nothing could be at once more useless and illiberal than those Arguments for exorbitant Terms, which are drawn from Considerations of the Enemy's Perfidy. For they tend to increase that national Partiality, which is ever the greatest Obstruction to a fair Agreement, and serve to no other Purpose, than that bad one, of leading our Attention from our Interests to our Resentments; and however they make a Performance popular for a Day, they will inevitably disgust all People of Judgement, who know that such Topicks never can be admitted in the Management of publick Business, and that they are wholly remote from the Stile which civilized Nations use towards each other when they come to negotiate. There are indeed many warm, and perhaps well-meaning People, but certainly very much deceived, who imagine, that a
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Man's Zeal for his Country is to be estimated by the Passion with which he expresses himself against the Enemy. They consider an inflamed Declamation as the Language of Patriotism; and having heated their Imaginations with horrid Pictures of their Enemies, they come at last to think it no Injustice in themselves to do those very things, for which, they so abhor and abominate others. But for my part, as I never thought it right or prudent arrogantly to demand what we may be obliged shamefully to renounce, I have always thought that Moderation, Moderation at least in Language, was what became every Condition of Fortune; and that without it, Prosperity in particular, is never respectable, and not always safe: and I rejoice from my heart that we are now in such a State, that I may with Propriety apply to my Countrymen these beautiful Lines, which if they were not written, were at least revised and approved by one of the greatest Captains of Antiquity, and one who contributed the most to the Embellishment as well as the Grandeur of his Country.

*Quam estis maxime
Potentes, Dites, Fortunati, Nobiles,
Tam maxime vos æquo animo æqua noscere
Oportet; si vos vultis perhiberi probos.*

F I N I S.